Things I Won’t Work With: Bad Password Hashing Algorithms

In the realm of cybersecurity, few things send a shiver down my spine quite like encountering bad password hashing algorithms. We’re living in an era where data breaches are so common they hardly make headlines anymore, yet some developers are still stuck using hashing algorithms that should have been retired years ago. It’s like watching someone try to patch a leaking dam with duct tape—sure, it might hold for a while, but when it fails, it’s going to be catastrophic. If your security strategy involves MD5, SHA-1, or—God forbid—no hashing at all, I’m afraid we have nothing to discuss.

Here’s the problem: bad hashing algorithms aren’t just weak—they’re fundamentally broken in today’s threat landscape. MD5 and SHA-1, once the stalwarts of password protection, have been so thoroughly compromised by collision attacks and rainbow tables that relying on them is akin to locking your front door with a zip tie. Attackers can precompute vast databases of possible hash values and crack these algorithms faster than you can say “data breach.” And yet, I still see organizations treating these outdated hashes like they’re an acceptable risk. Newsflash: they’re not. They’re the equivalent of using a toy padlock on a bank vault.

Take, for instance, that one time an unnamed company (because I’m generous and don’t want to embarrass anyone too much) decided to store all their users’ passwords with a lovely little MD5 hash—because, hey, it’s faster, right? Fast-forward a few months, and the entire database ends up online, cracked open like a cheap piñata at a kid’s birthday party. The hackers didn’t just take the passwords—they cracked them so quickly they had time to post a detailed blog explaining how they did it, complete with a countdown timer showing how fast MD5 folded under pressure. The company’s reaction? They claimed they didn’t see it coming. I mean, really? That’s like standing in the middle of a thunderstorm holding a metal rod and saying, “I didn’t think I’d get struck by lightning.” The aftermath was as predictable as it was tragic: a lot of angry users, a lot of public apologies, and a rapid, frantic migration to bcrypt that could have saved them all that grief in the first place.

There’s no excuse for this in 2024. We have better options—bcrypt, Argon2, scrypt—algorithms designed specifically to withstand brute-force attacks by being computationally expensive and slow to crack. Sure, they might require a bit more processing power and a little more planning, but they provide the kind of security that MD5 and SHA-1 simply can’t. Transitioning to strong, modern hashing algorithms isn’t just a best practice; it’s a necessity. Because when—not if—your weakly hashed passwords get exposed, you’re not just facing a technical problem; you’re facing a public relations nightmare. And let’s be honest, once your customers’ trust is shattered, there’s no amount of hashing, good or bad, that’s going to fix that.